This paper addresses the question of whether prescription drug coverage for Medicare beneficiaries is associated with lower spending for hospital and physician services. We discuss the theoretical rationale for this relationship and the empirical challenges in estimating it. We then test the hypothesis using data from the 1999 and 2000 Medicare Current Beneficiary Surveys. Our results suggest that while drug coverage significantly increases spending on medications, there is no consistent evidence of increases or decreases in Medicare spending for hospital or physician services. We conclude that the cost of the new Medicare Part D drug benefit is unlikely to produce cost offsets elsewhere in the program.
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There is a widespread belief that giving people good drug benefits will generate savings elsewhere in the health care system. President Bush echoed these sentiments when he signed the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) into law in 2003. He said: ''Drug coverage under Medicare will allow seniors to replace more expensive surgeries and hospitalizations with less expensive prescription medicine'' (White House 2003) . There are important reasons why policymakers should focus on potential cost offsets from drug benefits. First, prescription drugs have become the fastest rising component of national health expenditures over the last half-decade and are projected to significantly outpace other service sectors for at least another decade to come (Heffler et al. 2003) . A finding of significant cost offsets would put this trend in a much more favorable light from a policy perspective. Second, cost offsets may be a marker for real improvements in population health. To the extent that drug coverage improves medical management, this impact should be reflected in a reduction in emergency room visits, hospitalizations, and other cost-generating services associated with suboptimal care.
The new Part D drug benefit under Medicare presents two additional reasons why policymakers should focus on drug cost offsets. On the one hand, given the billions of dollars in projected Part D costs over the coming decade, finding cost offsets would provide some hope that this expensive benefit would be sustainable in a Medicare program that is fast approaching insolvency. On the other hand, there is the possibility that the new benefit actually will increase outlays on traditional Medicare services. Most beneficiaries receive their new drug benefits from stand-alone, at-risk prescription drug plans (PDPs). The PDPs profit by keeping medication expenses low and have no way of knowing how their cost-management policies (such as drug formularies, prior authorization requirements, and tiered copayments) affect expenditures for hospitalization and other Medicare services. Tracking cost offsets is one way to monitor unintended consequences of plan behavior.
Given the potential importance of cost offsets, it seems prudent to review the rationale and evidence that prescription drug coverage produces savings in other service sectors. The next section examines the theoretical reasons why policymakers might expect to see savings from prescription coverage and then evaluates the empirical literature on the subject. We then describe the analytic challenges to directly estimating the relationship between coverage and medical costs and present an empirical test of the association using data from the 1999 and 2000 Medicare Current Beneficiary Surveys. Sections on study findings and implications for the Medicare Part D drug benefit round out the presentation.
Background
Economic theory posits that medical care is a ''normal good'' (i.e., that demand is inversely related to price). Because health insurance lowers the effective price to consumers at the time health care services are used, theory predicts that insured people will use more health care than uninsured people, all else being equal. In cases where one type of health service can substitute for another, theory also predicts that a drop in price for one good will lower the demand for the substitute. There is considerable evidence that prescription coverage increases drug use (see literature summarized in Pauly 2004), but very little direct evidence that drugs substitute for physician services, hospitalizations, and other services, or how the generosity of prescription coverage affects this relationship. Drugs might be the therapy of choice, but individuals who have no drug coverage may select less optimal services. Alternatively, avoidance of expensive drug therapy by those without coverage could have negative health consequences, leading to higher Medicare service use to address these problems.
Economic theory also posits that when the price of a complementary good falls, the demand for both the good itself and its complement will rise. This leads to a second way in which Part D might affect Medicare Part A (hospital) and B (medical) spending. Because physician services are a complement to prescription drug fills, we expect that people with prescription coverage would be more likely to visit physicians, and thereby spend more on Medicare Part B services. Furthermore, increased physician usage could lead to increasing rates of diagnostic tests, surgery, and other expensive procedures.
Given the complex relationship between drug therapy and other medical services, there is reason to expect that both substitutes and complements will play a role. For example, in the management of certain conditions like hypertension, a combination of medication and frequent physician visits are complementary aspects of high-quality treatment. For other conditions, such as longterm management of chronic asthma, treatment with appropriate asthma medication can prevent hospitalization, thus lowering inpatient spending.
A final theoretical consideration is the proposition that individuals who have high expected demand for drugs (as well as for drug complements and substitutes) have strong incentives to insure against these expected losses, particularly in markets with community rating where the individual's expected loss is higher than the actuarial loss upon which premiums are based. Individuals with low expected spending have less incentive to pursue prescription coverage. An important consequence of this selection behavior is that unadjusted measured differ-ences in spending between Medicare beneficiaries with and without prescription coverage will capture both selection and price effects. In the case of drug substitutes, the selection effect will tend to work in the opposite direction from the price effect (e.g., individuals with high expected drug use are likely to be less healthy, and thus have greater risk of hospitalization compared to healthier individuals who eschew drug coverage), thus suppressing the true price effect of coverage on the demand for substitutes. In the case of drug complements, the selection and price effects tend to work in the same direction, thus exaggerating the apparent price effect of coverage on the demand for complements. A crucial question for researchers is whether such individual selection effects are based on observable factors.
A 2002 review by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) concluded that ''little good evidence exists from which to determine the net effect of drug coverage on other Medicare services; but overall, costs of other services would probably not change significantly'' (U.S. CBO 2002). The CBO reviewed three types of studies: 1) research on particular drugs and drug classes, 2) studies of the impact of changes in prescription coverage affecting vulnerable populations, and 3) analyses of populations using older versus newer medications.
Results from studies in the first category are often difficult to generalize to the Medicare population since few elderly people participate in clinical trials. However, the most compelling reason why trial data represent a poor basis for measuring cost offsets to drug use is that they are available for only a small fraction of the drug products on the market, and then only for approved indications.
The second type of evidence comes from a few studies that have found significant adverse events following reductions in coverage. The well-known research by colleagues (1991, 1994 ) that attributed increased nursing home admissions and acute mental health services to the imposition of a three-per-month limit on prescriptions in the New Hampshire Medicaid program fall into this category. More recent work by Tamblyn et al. (2001) found that increased cost-sharing for drug products resulted in higher rates of emergency visits and hospitalizations for elderly and poor recipients of Quebec's provincial health insurance program. These findings clearly are not generalizable to the Medicare population, but more importantly, it does not necessarily follow that if bad effects arise from restricted access, then increased access to drugs will result in improved care and cost savings.
The final piece of evidence that drugs may produce cost offsets comes from two studies by Lichtenberg (1996 Lichtenberg ( , 2001 ) that compared health care spending for individuals using older and newer drugs. Findings from both a longitudinal and a cross-sectional model indicated that people taking newer drugs had lower mortality, fewer hospital admissions, shorter lengths of stay, and fewer surgical interventions compared to those using older therapies. These are intriguing findings, but the case for savings depends heavily on several restrictive assumptions that recently have been challenged by Miller, Moeller, and Stafford (2006) and Zhang and Soumerai (2007) .
It is important to note that all of the studies reviewed thus far relate to possible cost offsets from drug use, not drug coverage. In two recent studies, the authors found mixed evidence of cost offsets from drug coverage of Medicare beneficiaries. One used a longitudinal panel design to track quarterly Medicare spending for beneficiaries with continuous drug coverage compared to beneficiaries who gained prescription benefits during the course of the study . No significant differences in either physician or hospital spending attributable to drug coverage were found. The second study used a cross-sectional design with inverse propensity score weighting to compare Medicare spending as a function of drug coverage for beneficiaries with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) ). This study provided weak evidence in support of the cost offset hypothesis based on signs on the model coefficients, but the sample sizes were small and only one in 12 comparisons was statistically significant.
These studies had other limitations. The Briesacher et al. analysis focused on the potential for short-term cost offsets for people gaining drug coverage. These results are germane to understanding the initial impact of the MMA, but have little to say about the long-term effects of coverage, particularly on beneficiaries requiring lifelong medication therapy. The COPD study had no explicit longitudinal component, but the cross-sectional findings reflected the impact of duration of coverage for those with drug benefits. Because almost 83% of the insured beneficiaries with COPD had either employer-sponsored plans or Medicaid, it is reasonable to infer that most had longstanding coverage. The present study uses the same statistical procedures employed in the earlier COPD work, but applies them to a much larger nationally representative sample of Medicare beneficiaries.
Data Source
The data for this analysis were taken from the 1999 and 2000 Medicare Current Beneficiary Surveys (MCBS). The MCBS is a longitudinal panel survey of a representative national sample of the Medicare population conducted under the auspices of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Begun in the fall of 1991, approximately 12,000 Medicare beneficiaries are surveyed every year. The MCBS uses a rotating panel design in which a new round of about 4,000 beneficiaries is selected each year from Medicare enrollment files and a prior round of equal size is retired. Respondents in each round are followed for up to three years. The survey instrument includes detailed questions about demographic characteristics, access to care, Medicare supplemental insurance coverage (including questions about the presence and source of prescription benefits), health and functional status, and utilization and spending for all health care services including prescription drugs. The MCBS prescription coverage information is obtained from a follow-up question to queries regarding type of Medicare supplements mentioned by respondents (''does plan x cover prescription drugs?''). The survey tracks up to five private supplemental plans plus Medicaid and other public plans for each respondent with updates obtained every four months. MCBS interviewers are also particularly careful in recording prescription fills. Respondents are asked to maintain logs of prescriptions and to keep insurance slips and used medication containers. At the time of the interview, respondents are asked to show all medication containers, and the interviewer records each fill or refill as a separate event noting drug name, strength, dosage, and method of administration. Interviewers also query respondents about medications not mentioned but recorded in previous interviews. The MCBS files also include Medicare Part A and B claims for each respondent.
Study Sample
Our sample was comprised of all communitydwelling MCBS respondents represented in both the 1999 and 2000 survey rounds. We identified all Medicare beneficiaries who had 24 months of observation and continuous Medicare Part A and Part B coverage. We examined the diagnostic fields in the Medicare claims files to characterize the comorbidities of the population during the first 12 months. We used the last 12 months of data to characterize beneficiaries' spending for prescription drugs, inpatient hospital care, and physician services. We restricted the group with drug coverage to those who had it continuously throughout the study period. Likewise, the group without drug benefits was limited to those with no evidence of coverage at any time during the period. We also excluded beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare+Choice health plans because these individuals generate no Medicare claims, and hence have no diagnostic information. Finally, to avoid bias arising from the effect of having other medical insurance, both groups were limited to beneficiaries maintaining continuous Medicare supplementation for physician services and hospital care. These selection criteria resulted in a sample of 3,365 of whom 2,603 had prescription coverage and 762 did not.
Measures
We assessed the relationship of drug coverage to spending for outpatient drugs, inpatient hospitalization, physician services, and all Medicare Part A and B services combined. Drug prices were converted to average wholesale prices (AWP) to assure that differences in spending between beneficiaries with and without drug coverage were not affected by payer discounts or rebates. 1 The independent variables included: drug coverage, age, race, gender, marital status, annual income, educational attainment, geographic region of residence, an indicator for beneficiaries previously entitled to Medicare under Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) but who are now 65 or older, and predicted Medicare spending based on the diagnostic cost group/hierarchical coexisting condition (DCG/HCC) model developed by CMS to set capitation rates for Medicare health maintenance organizations (HMOs). The DCG/HCC risk adjuster creates indicators for the presence of 189 medical conditions based on the diagnoses recorded on a patient's Medicare claims (Pope et al. 2004 ). It then applies previously calibrated weights, based on regression coefficients, to approximately 100 of these conditions to create a single risk score (denoted as ''Ybase'').
Statistical Analysis
We assessed the impact of prescription coverage on Medicare and drug spending using the method of inverse propensity score weighting. A common problem arises in observational studies when ''treated'' subjects (i.e., those who have drug coverage) are not well matched to ''controls'' (those who have no drug coverage) on factors thought to be correlated with ''treatment.'' When that happens, covariate control through regression can produce unreliable estimates even if all relevant variables are observable (Rubin 2001 ). An increasingly popular and intuitive way to assure balance between treatment and control groups is the method of propensity scores developed in the mid-1980s by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983 Rubin ( , 1984 Rubin ( , 1985 Rosenbaum 1984a,b; Rubin 1991) . The propensity score (PS) for an individual is simply the estimated probability of being assigned to treatment as a function of a set of observed characteristics using a logit or probit model.
In the classic PS application, subjects are randomly arrayed within two groups by treatment status. The first treated subject is matched to a control with the closest PS value and the pair is set aside. Matching continues until it becomes impossible to find a pair with scores similar enough based on predetermined criteria for nearness. The new (reduced) sample of matched subjects then is used to estimate average treatment effects by comparing mean outcome values for treated versus control subjects.
More recent work has shown that the same result can be obtained by inverse PS weighting (individuals in the control group each are weighted by their PS values and treated individuals are weighted by 1-PS) thereby obviating the need for establishing nearness criteria (McWilliams et al. 2003 (McWilliams et al. , 2004 . With inverse PS weighting, the mean characteristics of the two groups are not merely close, they are identical. As with the classic matching application, the average treatment effect can be determined by calculating the difference in mean weighted outcome values for the two groups. The method of propensity scores has another advantage over ordinary regression. Because the propensity scores are estimated without regard to the dependent variable, it is unnecessary to make any assumptions about the functional form by which treatment impacts the outcome of interest. 2 However, as with ordinary regression, the ability of PS methodology to produce consistent and unbiased estimates of treatment effects is predicated on the assumption of no unobserved heterogeneity in treatment assignment that might be correlated with the outcome of interest. This is a potential concern in the current context given the theoretical expectation that Medicare beneficiaries self-select into drug coverage based on factors that might or might not be observable. If selection into drug coverage is conditioned by unobserved factors, then inverse PS will produce biased estimates.
To assess this possibility, we used the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) to test for endogeneity of drug coverage. The DWH test involves a two-step process. In the first step, the potentially endogeneous explanatory variable (drug coverage) is regressed against all of the exogenous variables (as in the PS approach). The residuals from this regression then are included together with the drug coverage variable in regression models estimating drug and Medicare spending levels. The coefficient on the drug coverage residuals variable in each regression then is tested against zero using an F test. If this coefficient is significantly different from zero, then exogeneity is rejected and some other approach (e.g., instrumental variables or Heckman selection correction) is necessary to control for confounding on nonobservables. We conducted a total of eight tests, two each for the four outcome variables. Based on prior research Stuart, Simoni-Wastila, and Chauncey 2005; Shea et al. 2006) , we had reason to believe that the inclusion of the DCG/HCC risk adjuster would control for selection bias, so we estimated otherwise identical models with and without this variable. The models without the DCG/HCC variable consistently failed the DWH exogeneity test, whereas every model with the DCG/HCC variable passed the test. In other words, while beneficiaries do indeed self-select drug coverage, the selection process itself is conditioned on observable risk factors captured by the DCG/HCC. Table 1 compares the characteristics of the two study groups with and without prescription coverage in 1999 and 2000. The first two columns present unadjusted mean proportions. As is evident, there are large differences in the characteristics of the two groups. Almost 70% of drug spending for beneficiaries with drug coverage was paid for by third parties. Beneficiaries with drug coverage were much more likely to be SSDI disabled (13.4% versus 4.3%) or previously disabled (7.8% versus 3.5%); younger (33% of the no coverage group were 80 or older compared to just 21% of those with drug coverage); more likely to live in cities (75% versus 64%); and more likely to reside in the Northeast or West. Predicted Medicare expenditures based on the DCG/HCC risk adjuster were over 20% higher among those with prescription coverage (Ybase of 1.02 versus .81). The third column in Table 1 presents the inverse propensity score-weighted sample proportions which, by definition, are the same for each group (the logistic regression results from the propensity score model are available from the authors upon request). For most, but not all characteristics, the weighted population proportions fall between the two group means (the exceptions are age and metropolitan residence). Table 2 presents unadjusted means and standard errors for the drug and Medicare spending variables assessed in the study, arrayed according to beneficiaries' prescription coverage status. Medicare beneficiaries with continuous drug benefits exhibited higher annual spending levels for all service types, ranging from $264 more for hospital services to $1,006 more for AWP-priced prescription drugs. The difference in spending for all Medicare services combined ($1,053) was larger still, indicating that beneficiaries with drug coverage were high users of Medicare services other than physician and hospital care. Taken together, these unadjusted associations would suggest that prescription benefits increase rather than reduce medical costs. Table 3 presents the propensity score-adjusted spending estimates for those with and without prescription coverage. The differences were generally smaller than in the unadjusted comparisons, and in two cases (inpatient hospital and all Medicare spending) the signs became negative, which was consistent with the cost-offset hypothesis. However, neither association was statistically significant. 3 The difference in drug spending between the two matched groups fell by nearly a third, from $1,006 to $712, and remained statistically significant after adjustment. 4 The significant difference in unadjusted spending for physician services ($294) declined to an insignificant difference ($106) with propensity score adjustment.
Findings

Discussion
The study findings demonstrate that unadjusted comparisons between Medicare bene-ficiaries with and without prescription coverage present a misleading picture of the true impact of drug coverage on spending for other services. Taking account of observable differences in demographics and health status cuts the unadjusted difference in drug spending by a third, and substantially reduces the measured differences in spending for Medicare services; indeed, the adjusted differences were negative for two of the three measures of medical spending (inpatient hospital services and total Medicare spending). Negative signs would support the cost-offset hypothesis, but neither result was statistically significant.
We conducted a number of sensitivity tests to confirm the study findings. First, we were able to rule out endogeneity of drug coverage in the presence of the DCG/HCC risk adjuster as explained earlier in the methods section. This is an important finding, both because exogeneity is a precondition for matching on propensity scores (Rubin 2001) and because it obviates the need for more complex (and less efficient) econometric techniques using instrumental variables or control functions. Second, we reanalyzed the data using generalized linear model (GLM) regression with spending modeled as a gamma distribution with a log link ). The results from the GLM models differed from the PS findings in that the estimated effects of drug coverage on inpatient hospital and total Part A and B spending were positive rather than negative; however, the coverage coefficients in both equations were small and insignificant. We then used both PS and regression methods to estimate drug coverage effects for beneficiaries with employer-based health insurance. This subanalysis was designed to test cover- age effects in a population that generally does not have the opportunity to individually select drug benefits independent of other medical insurance coverage. The results provided no evidence supporting the cost-offset hypothesis; albeit, the sample of employerbased insurance recipients without drug coverage was quite small .
In a final sensitivity test, we pooled four biannual cross-sections of MCBS respondents from 1996 through 2000 to boost sample size and statistical power. Both the PS and GLM models produced results very similar to the findings for the single 1999-2000 cross-section reported here. In the pooled PS models, prescription coverage was estimated to increase drug spending by a significant 67% (versus 66% in the single cross-section); to increase physician spending by an insignificant 6% (versus 8%); and to decrease inpatient hospital spending by an insignificant 3% (versus 14%). The only difference in sign was for total Part A and B spending: the pooled 1996-2000 prediction was an insignificant 3% increase associated with drug coverage versus an insignificant decrease of 2% in the single 1999-2000 crosssection .
In general, we consider the PS results to be more reliable than GLM because of major differences in sample composition between the groups with and without drug coverage. Nonetheless, from an empirical standpoint it makes little difference in that neither approach provided any significant evidence of cost offsets associated with drug coverage.
The study results should be interpreted in light of several limitations. First is the crosssectional design. We did not observe drug coverage status prior to the two-year study window; thus our findings may underestimate the true impact of long-term continuous coverage to the extent that some individuals in the group with current coverage lacked drug benefits in the past or that some individuals without current coverage had drug benefits at some prior period of time. Previous studies of the duration of drug coverage in the Medicare population have found evidence of churning, but stability is the rule for the majority of beneficiaries (Stuart, Shea, and Briesacher 2001; Stuart, Simoni-Wastila, and Chauncey 2005) . While we make no claim that our findings reflect the true long-term benefits attributable to continuous coverage, they are consistent with our earlier null finding using a longitudinal design .
Our results also are limited by the study's exclusion criteria and relatively small sample sizes. The study findings are strictly generalizable only to beneficiaries who have basic Medicare supplements, reside in the community, and are treated by fee-for-service providers. The exclusion of beneficiaries with no Medicare supplemental coverage is important in that these individuals are likely to react differently to drug benefits compared to those with basic Medicare supplements. The exclusion of nursing home residents is unlikely to affect the main study conclusions. The nursing home population is small and recent evidence suggests that prescription coverage has no significant impact on drug utilization rates among these residents . The exclusion of managed care enrollees is more serious. One might expect systematic differences between beneficiaries in fee-for-service and Medicare Advantage plans where the drug benefits are more likely to be managed. Based on findings from the pooled data set, small sample size does not appear to be the reason for our failure to find significant cost offsets, but additional work with larger data sets and more nuanced measures of drug coverage is clearly called for before any definitive inferences can be drawn.
Conclusions
Our findings are broadly consistent with those of the Congressional Budget Office (2002) that Medicare Part D drug benefits are unlikely to generate cost offsets in Part A or Part B expenditures. We tested the association of drug benefits and Medicare spending for a group with quite generous coverage. On average, 70% of the total drug spending by those with coverage was paid by third parties. We consider it unlikely that cost offsets would arise from the much less generous standard benefit under Part D. On the other hand, the Part D low-income subsidy program offered to eligible beneficiaries with incomes below 150% of the federal poverty line is more generous than the coverage assessed in our study, and for that reason might be more likely to generate offsets. Further research is necessary to determine whether generosity of coverage matters in this regard.
Our findings should not be taken as evidence that prescription drugs do not substitute or complement other therapies, but rather that neither effect appears to predominate across the Medicare population as a whole. If there are savings, they likely will come from better management of the drug benefit for beneficiaries with disease condi-tions particularly sensitive to drug therapy. Obvious candidates include hypertension, heart disease, diabetes, mental illness, and certain respiratory conditions. All are prevalent among Medicare beneficiaries, so improved therapeutic management in these areas could generate significant savings to the program. Less obvious, but potentially just as important, are conditions exacerbated by inappropriate drug treatment. Frail elders with multiple chronic diseases are at greatest risk for drug-induced illness and injury.
Whether future studies confirm coveragerelated cost savings or-as in the present article-fail to find them, the fact remains that drug coverage offers Medicare beneficiaries important economic protection from rising prescription costs. Policymakers thus would be ill advised to measure the success or failure of Part D based on evidence of cost offsets.
Notes
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CMS.
1 Our interest is to detect ''real'' medication use differentials between those with and without prescription coverage, where ''real'' use reflects the mix of drugs (brand and generic) as well as the count of medications filled. The AWP represents a convenient standard for this purpose. Comparing expenditures without this adjustment would have commingled ''real'' differences with price discounts and rebates available only to insured individuals. While it is true that Medicare beneficiaries who gain drug coverage under Part D presumably will use medications purchased at discounted prices, it is likely that the pattern of discounts will differ from that observed pre-Part D (for one thing, Medicaid dual eligibles no longer will qualify for Medicaid ''best price'' rules and rebates). 2 This feature offers a distinct advantage over regression models of spending data. Because expenditures typically are highly right skewed, the regression modeler must select a functional form (log, gamma, or other form) to fit the data, and then retransform back to normal dollars. No such adjustment is needed in pairwise PS matching. 3 We also compared propensity-adjusted estimates for the probability of hospitalization and the level of hospital spending among those with at least one hospitalization. The odds ratio was a nonsignificant .9 for beneficiaries with drug coverage. The adjusted difference in spending among hospital users was similarly small, negative, and insignificant. 4 This dollar difference, when converted to an arc elasticity based on an own-price difference of .7 (uninsured pay 1.0, insured pay .3 of every dollar in expenditure), yields an estimated price elasticity of demand for drugs of 2.46, which is well within the consensus range of previous studies. See arc elasticity formula published online at: http://economics.about. com/cs/micfrohelp/a/arc_elasticity_2.htm
